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Coordination games have become a critical tool of analysis in fields such as development
and institutional economics. Understanding behavior in coordination games is an important
step toward understanding the differing success of teams, firms, and nations. This article
investigates the relationship between personal attributes (cognitive ability, risk-aversion,
patience) and behavior and outcomes in coordination games, an issue that, to the best of our
knowledge, has never been studied before. For the repeated coordination game that we
consider, we find the following: (1) cognitive ability has no statistically significant bearing
on any aspect of behavior or outcomes; (2) pairs of players who are more patient are more
likely to coordinate well and earn higher payoffs; and (3) risk-aversion has no statistically
significant bearing on any aspect of behavior or outcomes. These results are robust to
controlling for personality traits and demographic characteristics.
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Social interactions are routinely character-
ized by multiple equilibria: every game theory
text makes this point. Often, these equilibria are
Pareto-ranked, so the failure to coordinate effi-
ciently is a genuine tragedy (inter alia, Schell-
ing, 1960; Hardin, 1995; Weingast, 1997; We-
ber, 2006). The tragedy is especially salient in
the development and institutions literatures:
Bardhan (2005) notes that “pervasive coordina-
tion failures” may “afflict an economy at early
stages of industrial transformation” (p. 2, italics
in original), whereas Ray (1998) devoted an
entire chapter of his influential development
economics textbook to the issue of coordination
failures. And of course, coordination failure
models are a part of the Keynesian business
cycle tradition (Cooper & John, 1988). In this
article, we search for individual and group traits
that predict coordination on better equilibria.
We focus on a particular coordination game,
the repeated stag hunt. It is depicted in Figure 1.
The stag hunt’s key features are the presence of
two pure-strategy equilibria that are Pareto-
rankable: a dominating equilibrium (stag, stag)
that is risky, and a dominated equilibrium (rab-
bit, rabbit) that is risk free.
Because many social environments—politi-
cal, work, social— contain stag hunt, team-
joining elements (Skyrms, 2003), the ability to
play stag in a repeated game may be an impor-
tant skill for productive social interaction. In
public choice settings, the stag hunt might re-
flect the decision to go it alone (building your-
self a swimming pool, or “Bowling Alone”;
Putnam, 1995) or to cooperate in producing an
excludable good (helping to build a community
Omar Al-Ubaydli, Research Department, Bahrain Center for
Strategic, International and Energy Studies, Manama, King-
dom of Bahrain, and Department of Economics and Mercatus
Center, George Mason University; Garett Jones, Department
of Economics and Mercatus Center, George Mason University;
Jaap Weel, Facebook, Palo Alto, California.
We thank Marco Castillo, Dan Houser, Michael Ma-
kowski, and Ragan Petrie for helpful comments. We grate-
fully acknowledge financial support from the College of
Humanities and Social Sciences, George Mason University,
and from generous donors to the Interdisciplinary Center for
Economic Science, George Mason University.
Correspondence concerning this article should be ad-
dressed to Omar Al-Ubaydli, Bahrain Center for Strategic,
International and Energy Studies, PO Box 496, Manama,
Kingdom of Bahrain. E-mail: omar@omar.ec
Th
is
do
cu
m
en
ti
s
co
py
rig
ht
ed
by
th
e
A
m
er
ic
an
Ps
yc
ho
lo
gi
ca
lA
ss
oc
ia
tio
n
o
r
o
n
e
o
fi
ts
al
lie
d
pu
bl
ish
er
s.
Th
is
ar
tic
le
is
in
te
nd
ed
so
le
ly
fo
rt
he
pe
rs
on
al
u
se
o
ft
he
in
di
vi
du
al
u
se
r
an
d
is
n
o
t
to
be
di
ss
em
in
at
ed
br
oa
dl
y.
Journal of Neuroscience, Psychology, and Economics © 2013 American Psychological Association
2013, Vol. 6, No. 2, 71–96 1937-321X/13/$12.00 DOI: 10.1037/npe0000005
71
pool or a bowling league); in firm settings, the
stag hunt might reflect the decision to toil in a
cubicle rather than volunteer to join a high-
status team project.
Theory points toward three attributes that
could predict coordination on the Pareto-ranked
outcome: risk tolerance (a predictor of one-shot
coordination, because hunting rabbit is the risk-
dominant outcome), patience (as a result of the
repetition and the self-control required to re-
main with the same choice; Daly, Delaney &
Harmon, 2009); and cognitive skill (in part be-
cause cognitive skill usually predicts patience
and risk tolerance; Frederick, 2005; Benjamin,
Brown & Shapiro, in press; Burks, Carpenter,
Goette & Rustichini, 2009; and also because
understanding a game’s rules typically helps in
winning a game). Cognitive skill appears in
particular to predict good performance in a
Keynesian beauty contest (Gill & Prowse, 2012;
Burnham, Cesarini, Johannesson, Lichtenstein
& Wallace, 2009) and therefore may predict a
more accurate theory of mind. Individuals and
groups differ widely in these attributes, so if
these attributes predict coordination failure they
likely predict weaker institutions, less social
capital, and perhaps even greater business cycle
volatility. This article investigates how behavior
and outcomes in coordination games are related
to risk-aversion, patience, and cognitive ability.
Also known as the two-player minimum-
effort game, the stag hunt has been studied
extensively in the literature on coordination
games, especially the experimental literature
(Van Huyck, Battalio & Beil, 1990; see Devetag
& Ortmann, 2007 for a review). Scholars have
been particularly interested in analyzing behav-
ior in T-period versions of the game, with an
emphasis on understanding the factors that
make sustained (efficient) play of (stag, stag)
more likely. These factors include precedent
(Van Huyck, Battalio & Beil, 1991; Camerer &
Knez, 1994), information about play in previous
periods (Bornstein, Gneezy & Nagel, 2002; De-
vetag, 2003), leadership (Weber at al., 2001;
Brandts, Cooper & Fatas, 2007), horizon (Bern-
inghaus & Erhart, 1998; Schmidt, Shupp,
Walker & Ostrom, 2003), communication
(Cooper, DeJong, Forsythe & Ross, 1992;
Blume & Ortmann, 2007), and the exact nature
of the payoffs (Rankin, Van Huyck & Battalio,
2000; Brandts & Cooper, 2006).
However, although economists have inten-
sively studied whether differences in institu-
tions influence coordination, they have not yet
investigated (with the exception of Al-Ubaydli,
2011) whether differences in the players them-
selves influence coordination. Our article begins
that process.
In our experiment, we record player choices
in 10-period stag hunts, and we collect data on
players’ attributes: cognitive ability, patience,
and risk-aversion. We then study the relation-
ship between a player’s (pair’s) attributes and
her (their) behavior in the stag hunt.1 In their
survey of the literature on cognitive ability and
personality traits, Borghans, Duckworth, Heck-
man, and Weel (2008) demonstrate the impor-
tance of such attributes to key life outcomes
(such as labor market earnings), and they call
for more research on their effects.
Because variation in such attributes is natu-
rally occurring rather than being varied exoge-
nously by an experimenter, we try to control for
as many potential sources of endogeneity as
possible. We collect data on personality traits
and demographics. Such controls are particu-
larly important given the frequently reported
positive relationships between cognitive ability
1 To the best of our knowledge, no such study has been
conducted. Al-Ubaydli (2011) looks at the relationship be-
tween behavior in a coordination game and risk-aversion,
but without any additional controls. Burks et al. (2009)
examines the impact of such factors on behavior in the
one-shot, sequential prisoner’s dilemma, and Jones (2008)
and Al-Ubaydli, Jones and Weel (2010) mimic the present
article but for the repeated prisoner’s dilemma. There are
good reasons to expect similarity in the mechanisms linking
personal attributes to behavior across these different game
types (see the discussion below), however the games still
differ in important ways and this is reflected in the different
results obtained.
Figure 1. Stag hunt. Row (column) denotes player 1’s
(2’s) strategy choice. First (second) number denotes player
1’s (2’s) payoff.
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and patience, and cognitive ability and risk tol-
erance (Frederick, 2005; Benjamin, Brown &
Shapiro, in press; Burks et al., 2009).
Our main results are as follows: risk-aversion
and cognitive ability have no bearing on any
aspect of behavior or outcomes in the stag hunt
at conventional significance levels, and individ-
ual patience predicts negligible effects on play-
ing stag, but pairs of players who on average are
more patient are both more likely to play (stag,
stag) and earn higher payoffs. The average pa-
tience of a pair of players is a statistically and
economically significant predictor of the ten-
dency to coordinate on (stag, stag).
The absence of an effect of cognitive ability
might seem unexpected, particularly because
recent work (Jones, 2008; Al-Ubaydli, Jones &
Weel, 2010) has found that cognitive skills pre-
dict success in repeated prisoners’ dilemma ex-
periments. However, Mueller (2004) notes that
repeated coordination games like the stag hunt
are far less cognitively demanding than repeated
prisoner’s dilemmas:
Pareto-optimal sets of strategies can be expected to
emerge when coordination games are repeated, under
far less demanding behavioral assumptions than are
needed to sustain Pareto-optimal outcomes in prison-
er’s dilemma supergames (Mueller, 2004; p. 15).
Mueller points to an evolutionary game the-
ory literature on the limited cognitive demands
of coordination games (inter alia, Wärneryd,
1990; Kandori, Mailath & Rob, 1993; and
Young, 1993). Our experimental results thus
confirm both Mueller’s specific prediction and
the deep relevance of this larger theoretical
literature.
In the majority of empirical studies, all
three of these traits— cognitive ability, pa-
tience, and risk tolerance—are modestly pos-
itively correlated. Thus, the fact that only one
of these traits strongly predicts stag hunt co-
ordination should be of interest to researchers
modeling the underlying structure and effects
of these traits. Our results suggest that pa-
tience is the driving cognitive force in Pareto-
optimal coordination.
Our results can also be applied; for exam-
ple those seeking to help a group suffering
from coordination failure, such as the use of
an inefficient technology standard. Our re-
sults suggest that forming a subgroup of pa-
tient players is likely to help that subgroup;
this can then be combined with a strategy of
gradual group expansion (Weber, 2006). Al-
ternatively, following the marketing and so-
cial psychology literatures, one could use
conscious and unconscious priming tech-
niques that draw players’ attentions to the
benefits of patience.
Experimental Design
Data Collection and Order
In our experiment, for each participant, we
collected data on the following:
• Behavior in the coordination game
• Personal attributes
• Cognitive ability
• Patience
• Risk-aversion
• Personality traits
• Demographic information
We had subjects play the game and then
collect data on personal attributes and cognitive
traits.2 The precise order of tasks was as given
in Figure 2.3
Procedure
All sessions were run at an Interdisciplinary
Center for Economic Sciences computer labo-
ratory at George Mason University (GMU).
Participants were recruited from a campus da-
tabase of students who had expressed an interest
in economics experiments. Sessions lasted an
average of approximately 100 minutes (inclu-
sive of check-in and payment processing), and
average earnings were approximately $30 per
participant. Sessions had exactly 8, 10, or 12
participants.
2 As has been demonstrated in the extensive psychology
literature on framing and anchoring (Bacharach & Char-
trand, 2000; Epley & Gilovich, 2004), any data based on
human choices is sensitive to payoff-irrelevant features of
the environment and experimental procedure. The main
payoff-irrelevant feature of concern for our study is that
there may be a spillover between the two data classes, for
example, the fact that we are collecting data on attributes
affects how people play in a coordination game, regardless
of the attributes. To minimize such bias, we made the
subjects play the game first.
3 The method for measuring cognitive ability (a 45-min
Raven’s test; see below) was the most mentally exhausting
for participants, and accounted for the lion’s share of cog-
nitive effort expended during a session. We therefore made
it the last task.
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Some of the tasks were incentivized, whereas
others were not (the detailed descriptions and
explanations are below). Participants received a
fixed fee for each unincentivized task. The
drawback of incentivized tasks is that they po-
tentially generate wealth effects. To minimize
such wealth effects, it was common knowledge
that participants would be paid for exactly one
of the incentivized tasks, with a die roll at the
end of the experiment determining which.
Because, by the standards of GMU experi-
ments, the experiment was quite long, cogni-
tively intensive, and involved large stakes, we
wanted to convey as much payment credibility
as possible. Consequently, for each of the un-
incentivized tasks, we paid the participants in
cash immediately after they completed the task
(we also paid the show-up fee in cash at the start
of the experiment).
For the entirety of the experiment, partici-
pants sat at private, individual desks with other
participants within eyeshot in the same room.
There was no communication. Though most of
the tasks were undertaken on the computer, all
instructions were printed, handed out, and read
aloud to all participants. See the Appendix for
the full instructions.
Coordination game.4 Participants were
anonymously and randomly assigned a partner
who would be their partner for 10 rounds. Each
round, the two players would play the stag hunt
in Figure 1 (with an exchange rate of 1 point 
1¢). Strategies were given a neutral frame
(green, blue rather than stag, rabbit).
At the end of each round, participants were
only informed of their earnings from that round
rather than the actual outcome. Thus anyone
playing rabbit could not infer whether their
partner was playing stag or rabbit. (Anyone
playing stag could infer their partner’s choice.)
This is the norm in the n-player versions of the
minimum-effort game, though some studies ex-
amine behavior when the entire action vector is
common knowledge after each round.
This could have the effect of making players
more likely to play the risky stag strategy to
acquire information about the other player’s
behavior. Thus, in a repeated game, playing stag
is in an important dimension safer (because
more informative) than playing rabbit. This
phenomenon is likely of genuine real-world im-
portance for stag-hunt-style interactions, and
may explain why risk-aversion ultimately has
no influence in the repeated game.
Personality survey. Participants were
asked to complete a Big-5 personality survey, a
standard measure of personality traits
(Borghans et al., 2008). Participants responded
to each of 50 statements about their personality
using a 5-point Likert scale (1  very inaccu-
rate, 5  very accurate). The 50 questions
broke down into 10 questions corresponding to
5 personality traits: openness to new experi-
ences, conscientiousness, agreeableness, extra-
version, and neuroticism. Participants were paid
a fixed fee of $5 after completing this survey
and the demographic survey regardless of their
responses.
Demographic survey. Participants were
asked a few questions about their personal de-
mographics (gender, age, class etc.) and their
self-reported scores in standardized tests (SAT,
GRE etc.).5
Risk-aversion survey. Participants com-
pleted a Hey-Orme risk preferences test (Hey &
Orme, 1994).6 Each period, the participant is
faced with a choice between two lotteries, each
over the same four outcomes ($0, $10, $20,
$30). The participant chooses which she prefers
(or expresses indifference). The participant does
4 In addition to playing a coordination game, participants
played a repeated prisoner dilemma as part of separate study
(see Al-Ubaydli, Jones & Weel, 2010). We randomized
which they played first by session, and we included session
effects in all our econometric tests to control for this. As
mentioned above, it was common knowledge that partici-
pants would be paid for exactly one of the incentivized
tasks.
5 Self-reported SAT (GRE) scores correlated 0.27 (0.20)
with IQ.
6 The instructions (see the appendix) are adapted from a
set provided by Glenn Harrison.
Figure 2. Order of tasks.
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this for 20 pairs (periods).7 To generate incen-
tives for truthful revelation, participants were
informed that—if it were the unique incentiv-
ized task for which they were paid—one of the
pairs would be selected at random at the end and
each participant will play out the lottery for
which she declared a preference.
We selected a Hey-Orme test rather than the
more conventionally deployed Holt-Laury test
(Holt & Laury, 2002) because it is a richer test
that permits more accurate identification of eco-
nomic risk-preference parameters. Using maxi-
mum likelihood estimation (see Harrison &
Rutstrom, 2008; Andersen, Harrison, Lau &
Rutstrom, 2008; see Wilcox, 2011 for a new
microeconometric model of risk-attitudes), one
can use the choice data to estimate the param-
eter K in the constant relative risk aversion
(CRRA) von Neumann-Morgenstern utility
function u(m)  mK, where m denotes $
wealth. K is a measure of risk tolerance (the
negative of risk-aversion: larger values indi-
cate less risk-aversion).
Patience survey. Participants were pre-
sented with a multiple price list (Harrison, Lau
& Williams, 2002; Andersen, Harrison, Lau &
Rutstrom, 2006) with 20 rows. For each row,
the participant is faced with a choice between
$10.00 tomorrow and $Y in one week. The
amount $Y started at $10.50 and increased in
$0.50 increments to $20.00. To generate incen-
tives for truthful revelation, participants were
informed that—if it were the unique incentiv-
ized task for which they would be paid—one of
the pairs would be selected at random at the end
of the experiment and each participant paid
according to their choice.
Tests of patience involving reasonable hori-
zons require participants to leave the laboratory
and receive payments at a later time. This gen-
erates credibility issues: to what extent are dif-
ferences in observed preferences the result of
differences in patience (the goal) versus dif-
ferences in the perceived credibility of the
experimenter with respect to payment deliv-
ery? (See Andersen et al., 2008; Andreoni &
Sprenger, 2012; for an extensive discussion of
these issues).
To minimize any variation in perceived cred-
ibility, we took several steps to demonstrate our
credibility at the decision-making stage. First,
both options in each choice entail an amount
that can only be received after exiting the lab-
oratory, that is, there is a front-end delay (see
Harrison, Lau & Williams, 2002).
Second, they were handed a contract on uni-
versity letterhead signed by us and them con-
firming the earliest time that they can retrieve
the envelope at a specified location on campus
(in one day or in seven days, depending on their
stated preference).
Our measure of patience is therefore the num-
ber of rows where the participant preferred the
amount to be received in one week (rather than
the following day).
Cognitive ability. Borghans et al. (2008)
define cognitive ability as the ability to under-
stand complex ideas, adapt effectively to the
environment, learn from experience, reason,
and overcome obstacles through purposeful
thought. For a complete discussion of intelli-
gence and its measurement, see Neisser et al.
(1996). There are many tests of cognitive abil-
ity. We use the Raven’s standard progressive
matrices test of intelligence, which is one of the
standard tools used in the literature (Borghans et
al., 2008). We use the Standard Progressive
Matrices Plus (SPM), which is between the
Standard and Advanced Progressive Matrices in
difficulty.
The test is composed of 60 problems. Each
problem consists of a pattern with a missing
segment, and 6 to 8 segments, only one of
which correctly completes the pattern (see the
appendix for examples). Participants were
given 45 minutes to complete the test. The
test was unincentivized. Borghans et al.
(2008) remark that the effect of incentivizing
tests of cognitive ability is for scores in the
lower tail to improve. We decided against
using incentives because we wanted to main-
tain comparability between our results and the
results reported in the psychology literature
(which typically do not use incentives).
Research Hypotheses
The above procedure yields data on a vector
of attributes that represents our explanatory
variables. We investigate the effect of these
explanatory variables on the following depen-
dent variables:
7 Participants do not know how many lottery pairs they
will have to ponder.
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• An Individual’s decision to play stag in a
given period
• A Pair’s success in achieving a play of
stag-stag in a given period
• An Individual’s total earnings for the 10-
period coordination game
• A Pair’s total earnings for the 10-period
coordination game
The previous literature gives us little basis for
predictions about the effect of personality or
demographics on any of the above dependent
variables. Here, we offer hypotheses for the
effects of risk-aversion, cognitive skill, and
patience.
In a one-shot sense, playing rabbit is risk-free
while playing stag generates payoff risk (this
underlies the concepts of risk- vs. payoff-
dominance; see Harsanyi & Selten, 1988). Thus
it seems sensible to expect that risk-aversion
will be a substantial determinant of outcomes.
In a (modified) 3-period version of the stag
hunt, Al-Ubaydli (2011) found that risk-
aversion was negatively related to picking stag,
though that study did not control for any addi-
tional attributes.
Using aggregate data, Jones (2008) finds that
people drawn from distributions with higher
cognitive ability are more likely to play coop-
erate in a prisoner’s dilemma. Using individual-
level data, and controlling for risk-aversion and
a host of additional attributes (though not pa-
tience), Burks et al. (2009) find a positive rela-
tionship between cognitive ability and the like-
lihood of playing trust and reciprocate in a
one-shot, sequential prisoner’s dilemma.
Jones’ (2008) explanation for these findings
is that higher cognitive ability allows people to
see the future with greater resolution; he also
notes that the greater patience of high-
cognitive-ability individuals makes Axelrod’s
(1984) “shadow of the future” more salient.
Both channels imply that high-ability players
are therefore better able to appreciate the ben-
efits of early cooperation, and consequently co-
operate more. Additionally, he notes that they
are more likely to understand the literal rules of
the game. The link between understanding the
repeated prisoner’s dilemma and “winning” in
the repeated prisoner’s dilemma is emphasized
by Axelrod (1984). Putterman, Tyran and Ka-
mei (2010) find that higher IQ predicts higher
contributions to a repeated public goods game,
which is an n-person prisoner’s dilemma. Be-
cause none of the three studies control for pa-
tience, and patience is usually positively related
to cognitive ability (Burks et al., 2009), it is not
clear whether cognitive ability or patience is
driving the result.
Despite the key payoff differences between
the stag hunt and the prisoner’s dilemma, they
do share a requirement of cooperation for avoid-
ance of an inefficient outcome. Consequently,
we would predict that cognitive ability, pa-
tience, or both are positively related to plays of
stag, and consequently to the remaining depen-
dent variables of interest.
Patience naturally matters because of the rep-
etition; playing stag early on can be seen as an
investment, one that may well be reasonable if
players have low discount rates. Further, exper-
imental work by Daly, Delaney and Harmon
(2009, p. 667) finds “strong evidence that self-
control has a strong independent effect on pa-
tience” and reports modest evidence that a mea-
sure of mindfulness, attention, and awareness is
positively correlated with patience. Thus our
survey measures of patience likely measure
traits with relevance beyond the discounting of
future income and utility flows.
In light of the documented relationships be-
tween cognitive ability, risk-aversion, and pa-
tience, a key feature of our study is the ability to
control for potential confounds. This will help
us gain a sharper understanding of what drives
successful coordination.
Empirical Results
We ran 16 sessions during spring 2010.
After eliminating observations where demo-
graphic data was missing or where subjects
had clearly not attempted the Raven test in a
serious manner, we are left with data from
167 subjects (yielding a total of 1670 behav-
ioral observations).8
Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 details the sample means and stan-
dard deviations of the main variables. Note that
8 The Raven’s standard progressive matrices test hand-
book contains statistical tables designed to allow the exper-
imenter to identify egregious cases of not seriously attempt-
ing the test. In our sample, only 3 subjects had their data
dropped for this reason.
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the risk tolerance parameter is based on a MLE
estimate of K in the von Neumann-Morgenstern
utility function u(m)  mK. The mean coeffi-
cient implies near-square-root utility. In Figures
3, 4, and 5, we can see histograms of Raven
score, patience, and risk tolerance. All three
depict rich variation. For instance, the Raven
standard deviation of 5.5 is close to the standard
deviation of 6.1 reported by Raven (2000) in a
large representative sample (albeit one based on
the slightly different Standard Progressive Ma-
trices), and Thoma et al. (2005) reported that
their own sample’s standard deviation on the
Raven of 6.36 were “consistent with published
normative values.” The same held true for our
sample: the standard deviation was consistent
with published normative values. Given our
rich variation, any restriction of range correc-
tions would have negligible effects on re-
ported relationships.
In Figure 4, we can see that around 35% of
observations imply a maximum level of pa-
tience (these participants all stated a prefer-
ence of $10.50 in one week to $10.00 tomor-
row). This is a particularly large proportion
compared with the literature (e.g., see Ander-
sen et al., 2008). One possibility is that this
was the result of our estimation procedure
being one of numerous tasks in the experi-
ment, or possibly of the relatively small
stakes. (Typically, experiments that measure
patience do so as the only task in the exper-
iment and with larger stakes).
Consequently, we conducted a follow-up sur-
vey with larger stakes, a finer measure of pa-
tience and where the only task was measuring
Figure 4. Histogram of standardized patience. M  16,
standard deviation  4.2.
Figure 5. Histogram of standardized risk tolerance. M 
0.63, standard deviation  0.23.
Table 1
Sample Statistics
Variable Mean SD
Raven score 42 (5.5)
Patience 16 (4.2)
Risk tolerance parameter 0.63 (0.23)
Openness (2 to  2 likert) 0.81 (0.54)
Conscientiousness (2 to  2 likert) 0.48 (0.65)
Extraversion (2 to  2 likert) 0.22 (0.73)
Agreeableness (2 to  2 likert) 1.0 (0.49)
Neuroticism (2 to  2 likert) 0.10 (0.74)
Age (years) 24 (4.5)
Male (dummy) 0.68 (0.47)
Play stag (dummy) 0.64 (0.48)
Pair playing stagstag (dummy) 0.55 (0.50)
Game earnings, individual ($) 5.9 (1.6)
Game earnings, pair ($) 12 (3.1)
Note. Data are from 167 observations.
Figure 3. Histogram of standardized Raven score. M 
42, standard deviation  5.5.
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the patience of the subjects. The results con-
firmed that our original measure of patience was
not an artifact of our procedure: the correlation
between the two measures was very high (0.69,
p value 1%). The high level of short-run pa-
tience may have been driven by the exception-
ally high payment credibility of GMU’s Inter-
disciplinary Center for Economic Sciences—
the laboratory where the experiments were
conducted.9
In Figure 6, we can see the time path of plays
of stag and of successful coordination by pairs
on the stag equilibrium. In both series, in the
second period, plays of stag and coordination
on stag rise sharply.
We also examine the autoregressive features
of the strategy time series. In aggregate, 81% of
plays of rabbit are followed by plays of rabbit,
with the corresponding figure for plays of stag
being 90%. Similarly, 88% of pairs who fail to
reach the stag-stag equilibrium in a given pe-
riod continue to fail in the subsequent period,
whereas 93% of those that succeed continue to
succeed. Thus, there is a lot of persistence in
behavior.
Table 2 depicts the sample correlations be-
tween the variables in the dataset. Consistent
with the literature (Benjamin, Brown & Sha-
piro, in press; Borghans et al., 2008; Burks et
al., 2009; Dohmen, Falk, Huffman & Sunde,
2010), we find a positive relationship between
cognitive ability and risk tolerance, and be-
tween cognitive ability and patience (though the
latter relationship does not attain statistical
significance).10
Also consistent with the literature, we find
that cognitive ability is uncorrelated with most
personality traits, with a weak positive relation-
ship between cognitive ability and openness.
Our data exhibits a slight inconsistency with the
literature in the negative relationship between
cognitive ability and neuroticism (usually they
are uncorrelated). Finally, in line with the liter-
ature on gender-differences (Croson & Gneezy,
2009), we find that males are indeed more risk
tolerant than females. Generally speaking, Ta-
ble 2 offers us reassurance about the soundness
of our data collection and the representative-
ness of our sample. Because Beauchamp, Ce-
sarini, and Johannesson (2011), using a test-
retest design, find that measurement error is a
serious issue when measuring psychometric
traits, all of the correlations we report below
may plausibly be interpreted as lower bounds
of the true relationship.
9 The number of students surveyed in this second pa-
tience task was large enough to establish the correlation
across the two patience measures, but too small to add value
in the regressions results, so only the in-experiment measure
is used in the results below.
10 Dohmen et al. (2010) summarize the extensive evi-
dence from the psychology literature on the relationship
between cognitive ability and patience as “mixed” (p2).
Figure 6. Time series of individual plays of Stag and pair plays of Stag-Stag.
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Estimation Strategy
Let Yits be the value taken by a dependent
variable for subject (or pair) i in period t of
session s. Let Ci denote i’s cognitive ability, Pi
denote i’s patience and Ri denote i’s degree of
risk tolerance (the negative of risk-aversion).
Let Xi be a vector of i’s remaining attributes.
Let Tj be a dummy variable that takes the value
‘1’ in period j and ‘0’ otherwise. Let Sk be a
dummy variable that takes the value ‘1’ in ses-
sion T k and ‘0’otherwise.
For each dependent variable that we investi-
gate, we estimate the following five models:
1. Yits    CCi  j210 jTtj 
k216 jSsk  its; cognitive ability only,
period/session effects
2. Yits    pPi  j210 jTtj 
k216 jSsk  its; patience only, period/
session effects
3. Yits    RRi  j210 jTtj 
k216 jSsk  its; risk tolerance only,
period/session effects
4. Yits    CCi  PPi  RRi 
j210 jTtj  k216 jSSk  its; cognitive
ability, patience, risk tolerance, period/
session effects
5. Yits    CCi  PPi  RRi 
XXi  j210 jTtj  k216 jSSk  its;
cognitive ability, patience, risk tolerance,
remaining attributes, period/session
effects
All regressions cluster the standard errors by
i (individual or pair). Sometimes, we estimate
models where the dependent variable is for a
single (time) cross-section, for example, earn-
ings. In that case, we retain the same structure
but we omit period effects and clustering of the
standard errors (since there is at most one ob-
servation per individual/pair).
As explained above, we are interested in four
dependent variables:
Play stag dummy. A dummy variable that
takes the value ‘1’when player i plays stag in
period t of session s, and ‘0’if she plays rabbit
Stag-stag dummy. A dummy variable
that takes the value ‘1’when pair i play the
stag-stag equilibrium in period t of session s,
and ‘0’if they play any of the three remaining
possibilitiesTa
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Earnings (individual). A variable denot-
ing the total dollar earnings of player i in
session s
Earnings (pair). A variable denoting the
total dollar earnings of pair i in session s
To facilitate the interpretation of the esti-
mated coefficients on the explanatory variables,
we use linear regressions (linear probability
model) rather than probits; our results are robust
to using probits (results available upon request).
Finally, in all regressions, unless stated oth-
erwise, the explanatory variables are standard-
ized by the sample statistics in Table 1, allow-
ing us to interpret the estimated coefficients as
the effect on the dependent variable of increas-
ing the explanatory variable by one standard
deviation.
Main Results
We begin by analyzing how frequently sub-
jects play stag.
Result 1. Cognitive ability has a negligible,
statistically insignificant positive effect on the
probability of playing stag; patience and risk
tolerance have a small, statistically insignificant
positive effect on the probability of playing
stag.
This result is based on the estimates reported
in Table 3. As can be seen, Result 1 is robust to
including the various controls. We also find that
agreeableness and being male have marginally
significant positive effects on the probability of
playing stag. A one standard deviation rise in
agreeableness predicts a 6% rise in the proba-
Table 3
The Effect of Attributes on the Probability of Playing Stag
Model 1 2 3 4 5
Dependent variable Play stag dummy Play stag dummy Play stag dummy Play stag dummy Play stag dummy
Unit Individual Individual Individual Individual Individual
Cognitive ability 0.0057 — — 0.0041 0.0011
(0.030) — — (0.031) (0.031)
Patience — 0.044 — 0.043 0.046
— (0.030) — (0.030) (0.030)
Risk tolerance — — 0.026 0.025 0.0032
— — (0.030) (0.031) (0.034)
Openness — — — — 0.00027
— — — — (0.031)
Conscientiousness — — — — 0.0048
— — — — (0.028)
Extraversion — — — — 0.015
— — — — (0.034)
Agreeableness — — — — 0.058
— — — — (0.033)
Neuroticism — — — — 0.045
— — — — (0.031)
Male (dummy; not
standardized) — — — — 0.14
— — — — (0.076)
Age (in years; not
standardized) — — — — 0.0014
— — — — (0.007)
R-squared 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.15
Observations 1670 1670 1670 1670 1670
Period effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Session effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustering Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note. Estimates are based on a linear probability model. Unless otherwise stated, all explanatory variables are standardized
based on the figures in Table 1. Standard errors are in parentheses. Unit refers to ‘individual’ vs. ‘group’ (i.e., whether the
dependent variable is defined at the level of the individual vs. pair). Estimated coefficients on constant, period, and session
effects omitted for parsimony. Asterisks denote statistical significance   10%,   5%,   1%.
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bility of playing stag, while males are 14%
more likely to do so.
Next, we turn our attention to how frequently
pairs reach the stag-stag equilibrium.
Result 2. Cognitive ability has a small, sta-
tistically insignificant negative effect on the
probability of the pair playing stag; increasing
each player’s patience by one standard devia-
tion increases the probability of the pair playing
stag-stag by 15% (p value 5%); greater risk
tolerance has a small, statistically insignificant
positive effect on the probability of the pair
playing stag-stag.
This result is based on the estimates reported
in Table 4. As a reminder that some of the
statistically insignificant relationships are im-
precisely estimated, note that the one standard
error bounds for the risk tolerance coefficient in
Table 4 range from 12% to 4.6%. As can be
seen, Result 2 is robust to including the various
controls. (In fact, the effect of patience strength-
ens when additional controls are introduced.)
The effect of patience is quite large, almost
equaling a third of a standard deviation of the
probability of a pair playing stag-stag.
We also find that neuroticism (15%) has a
marginally significant effect; even more re-
markable is the very large effect of both players
being male versus both players being female,
the former increasing the probability of playing
stag-stag by 40%.
To illustrate the link between patience and
coordination, we show two histograms in Figure
7: the average patience of a pair when a pair is
versus is not playing stag-stag. As can be seen,
the distribution stochastically dominates for the
observations where the pair is successfully co-
ordinating upon stag.
Table 4
The Effect of Attributes on the Probability of Reaching Stag-Stag
Model 1 2 3 4 5
Dependent variable Stag-stag dummy Stag-stag dummy Stag-stag dummy Stag-stag dummy Stag-stag dummy
Unit Pair Pair Pair Pair Pair
Cognitive ability 0.030 — — 0.071 0.095
(0.077) — — (0.084) (0.088)
Patience — 0.13 — 0.14 0.15
— (0.056) — (0.056) (0.072)
Risk tolerance — — 0.027 0.037 0.00076
— — (0.080) (0.083) (0.083)
Openness — — — — 0.078
— — — — (0.079)
Conscientiousness — — — — 0.020
— — — — (0.088)
Extraversion — — — — 0.019
— — — — (0.095)
Agreeableness — — — — 0.11
— — — — (0.072)
Neuroticism — — — — 0.15
— — — — (0.076)
Male (dummy; not
standardized) — — — — 0.40
— — — — (0.15)
Age (in years; not
standardized) — — — — 0.0011
— — — — (0.021)
R-squared 0.15 0.17 0.15 0.18 0.26
Observations 830 830 830 830 830
Period effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Session effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustering Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note. All explanatory variables are based on the average of the values of the two members of the pair. See Table 3 for
additional explanation.
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Next, we turn our attention to earnings.
Result 3. Cognitive ability has a negligible,
statistically insignificant effect on an individu-
al’s earnings; patience has a small, statistically
insignificant positive effect on an individual’s
earnings; greater risk tolerance has a small, sta-
tistically insignificant negative effect on an in-
dividual’s earnings.
This result is based on the estimates reported
in Table 5. As can be seen, Result 3 is robust to
including the various controls. We also find that
neuroticism ($0.39) and being male ($0.69)
have significant positive effects on an individ-
ual’s earnings.
Result 4. Cognitive ability and risk toler-
ance have a small, statistically insignificant neg-
ative effect on total earnings for a pair; increas-
ing each player’s patience by one standard
deviation increases a pair’s total earnings by
$1.20 (p value 5%).
This result is based on the estimates reported
in Table 6. As can be seen, Result 4 is robust to
including the various controls. (In fact, the ef-
fect of patience strengthens when additional
controls are introduced.) The effect of patience
is quite large, slightly more than a third of a
standard deviation. We also find that neuroti-
cism ($1) has a marginally significant effect.
Even more remarkable is the very large effect of
both players being male versus both players
being female, the former increasing total earn-
ings for a pair by $3.50.11
Before proceeding to synthesize these results,
it is worth noting that we investigated the rela-
tionship between cognitive ability/patience/risk
tolerance and several other aspects of behavior
in the repeated stag hunt. We looked at the plays
of stag in the first round, plays of stag in the
second round conditional on what occurred in
the first round, and plays of stag conditional
11 In this study, we do not attempt to explain the observed
relationship between behavior/earnings and personality
traits or gender. However, it is worth making the following
observation concerning the seemingly strong effect of being
male: in light of the well-documented finding that women
are more risk-averse than men, it is reasonable to wonder
whether our measure of risk-aversion is simply a noisy
measure and that being male is picking up the poorly
measured component. To investigate this possibility, we
repeat our major regressions but dropping the risk toler-
ance regressor. We find that the coefficient on being male
decreases slightly in magnitude (results available upon
request). Combining this with the strong, positive rela-
tionship in our dataset between being male and our mea-
sure of risk tolerance, we conclude that the strong effect
of being male is not the consequence of measurement
error in risk tolerance.
Figure 7. Histograms of standardized average patience of pair of players. The left histogram
corresponds to observations where the pair were not playing stag-stag, that is, the stag-stag
dummy  0; the right histogram corresponds to observations where the pair were playing
stag-stag, that is, the stag-stag dummy  1. Both histograms are standardized by the same
mean and standard deviation.
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on what occurred in the previous round in
general (rather than any specific round). In all
these cases, we failed to detect any systematic
relationships.
Synthesizing the Main Results
Our principal goal is to distinguish the ef-
fect of three variables (cognitive ability, pa-
tience and risk tolerance) on behavior and
outcomes in a coordination game, particularly
in light of the fact that cognitive ability is
positively related to patience and risk
tolerance.
Based on our data, behavior and outcomes
in a coordination game seem to be orthogonal
to cognitive ability. The same can be said of
risk tolerance. As an aside, being male in-
creases the selection of the “risky” stag strat-
egy and earnings; one might plausibly guess
that this is because being male proxies for
greater risk tolerance, yet this seems not to be
the case (see footnote 11).
In contrast to cognitive ability and risk
tolerance, patience has an impact. Players
who are more patient play stag slightly more
frequently than impatient players (see Table
3), and they earn slightly more (see Table 5);
however neither effect is statistically signifi-
cant. The real impact of patience occurs when
two patient people are matched together, with
the stag-stag equilibrium frequency and total
group earnings both rising.
To confirm this, we repeat the regressions
that correspond to Result 2 and Result 4 with
one difference: rather than using the average
patience of a pair, we use the minimum pa-
tience or the maximum patience. Using the
maximum renders the effect of patience sta-
tistically insignificant, while using the mini-
mum generally strengthens the statistical sig-
Table 5
The Effect of Attributes on Individual Earnings
Model 1 2 3 4 5
Dependent variable Earnings ($) Earnings ($) Earnings ($) Earnings ($) Earnings ($)
Unit Individual Individual Individual Individual Individual
Cognitive ability 0.0067 — — 0.0093 0.0089
(0.12) — — (0.13) (0.13)
Patience — 0.21 — 0.21 0.20
— (0.13) — (0.13) (0.14)
Risk tolerance — — —0.063 0.069 0.15
— — (0.13) (0.13) (0.13)
Openness — — — — 0.12
— — — — (0.13)
Conscientiousness — — — — 0.19
— — — — (0.13)
Extraversion — — — — 0.036
— — — — (0.14)
Agreeableness — — — — 0.071
— — — — (0.13)
Neuroticism — — — — 0.39
— — — — (0.14)
Male (dummy; not standardized) — — — — 0.69
— — — — (0.30)
Age (in years; not standardized) — — — — 0.032
— — — — (0.029)
R-squared 0.19 0.21 0.19 0.21 0.27
Observations 167 167 167 167 167
Period effects No No No No No
Session effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustering No No No No No
Note. See Table 3 for additional explanation.
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nificance (results omitted for parsimony and
available upon request). This suggests the
possibility of a key complementarity between
the patience of the two players: there is evi-
dence of a “weak link” or O-ring element to
successful coordination (Kremer, 1993).
Additional results: Dynamics
Pairs of patient players are substantially
(15% per standard deviation) more likely to
play stag-stag than impatient pairs, yet pa-
tient individuals are only slightly more likely
(4% per standard deviation) than impatient
players to play stag. How can these seemingly
inconsistent observations be reconciled?
The key lies in a deeper examination of the
dynamics. Let us define “patient” players as
those with above-mean patience and “impa-
tient” players as those with below-mean pa-
tience. Figure 8 shows the time series of plays
of stag by patient versus impatient players,
confirming that patient players are only
slightly more likely to play stag than impa-
tient players. The averages rates are 66% for
patient players and 62% for impatient players.
Given that type-X players play stag Y% of
the time on average, the breakdown will lie
between two extremes:
1. Y% of type-X players always play stag
and (100 – Y)% always play rabbit (max-
imum between-player variation, minimum
within-player variation)
2. All type-X players play stag Y% of the
time and rabbit (100 – Y)% of the time
(minimum between-player variation,
maximum within-player variation)
Intuitively, it is easier for a player to coordi-
nate on stag-stag if her partner never varies
from playing stag himself. If instead they are
Table 6
The Effect of Attributes on Total Earnings for a Pair
Model 1 2 3 4 5
Dependent variable Earnings ($) Earnings ($) Earnings ($) Earnings ($) Earnings ($)
Unit Group Group Group Group Group
Cognitive ability 0.13 — — 0.47 0.63
(0.57) — — (0.63) (0.67)
Patience — 1.0 — 1.1 1.2
— (0.41) — (0.42) (0.53)
Risk tolerance — — 0.27 0.32 0.098
— — (0.57) (0.60) (0.62)
Openness — — — — 0.73
— — — — (0.60)
Conscientiousness — — — — 0.040
— — — — (0.65)
Extraversion — — — — 0.12
— — — — (0.74)
Agreeableness — — — — 0.66
— — — — (0.57)
Neuroticism — — — — 1.0
— — — — (0.58)
Male (dummy; not standardized) — — — — 3.5
— — — — (1.1)
Age (in years; not standardized) — — — — 0.037
— — — — (0.17)
R-squared 0.19 0.24 0.20 0.25 0.37
Observations 83 83 83 83 83
Period effects No No No No No
Session effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustering No No No No No
Note. All explanatory variables are based on the average of the values of the two members of the pair. See Table 3 for
additional explanation.
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switching randomly between stag and rabbit
(the second extreme), it is much harder to en-
sure that both players simultaneously play stag.
Further, when a player plays rabbit in the pre-
vious period, she is unaware of what her partner
played. Rabbit, considered the safe strategy in a
one-shot game, becomes a low-information
strategy (and hence a risky strategy) in the re-
peated game.
This intuition is supported by the data.
When both players play stag, a player plays
stag in the following round 96% of the time;
in contrast, when one plays stag and the other
plays rabbit, the one playing stag persists
with stag only 51% of the time.
With this in mind, it is possible that, in
addition to playing stag slightly more fre-
quently than impatient players, patient play-
ers play with greater persistence, that is,
lower within-player variation and higher be-
tween-player variation (closer to extreme 1
above). This is precisely what we find in
Results 5 and 6 below.
Result 5. Cognitive ability and risk toler-
ance have a statistically insignificant effect on
the persistence of playing stag and rabbit;
increasing a player’s patience by one standard
deviation increases his or her probability of
continuing a play of stag by 6% and of con-
tinuing a play of rabbit by 5% (p value 5%).
This result is based on the estimates reported
in Tables 7 and 8. Note that in both tables the
omitted estimated coefficients on the constant,
period, and session effects all imply that there is
a baseline persistence in play (this is also re-
flected in the statistics reported at the end of the
Descriptive Statistics section above). Conse-
quently, the estimated coefficient on patience
implies an accentuation of the persistence. We
also find that being male statistically signifi-
cantly increases the probability of continuing a
play of stag by 16%.
Let i be the standard deviation of player i’s
play stag dummy (across rounds). The average of
i for Group X (which we denote X) is a measure
of the within-player variation in stag play. If
Group X plays stag Y% of the time, then
X  0,  Y1001 Y100
Where the lower bound corresponds to
purely between-player variation (extreme
case 1 above) and the upper bound corre-
sponds to purely within-player variation (ex-
treme case 2 above). In the following result,
recall that we define “impatient players” as
those with below-mean patience, and “patient
players” as those with above-mean patience.
Result 6. Patient players exhibit substan-
tially less within-player variation in their stag
play (patient  0.16) than impatient players
(impatient  0.24); (p value 5% using a t test
or a MW-test).
Figure 8. Time series of individual plays of Stag. “Impatient” refers to players who have
below-mean patience and “Patient” refers to players who have above-mean patience.
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Result 6 reinforces Result 5.12 Patient pairs
play stag-stag more often as a result of a com-
bination of two factors:
1. Patient players play stag slightly more
often
2. Patient players are more persistent in their
choices, making it easier for both players
to coordinate on stag-stag
Conclusion
We find that pairs of players who are on aver-
age more patient—who have a lower rate of time
preference—are more likely to coordinate in a
stag hunt, a classic game of team effort. This is an
emergent phenomenon: a player’s patience has
only modest influence on her individual tendency
to play stag. Average patience generates success-
ful coordination in part because patient players are
more persistent in their tendency to play stag,
making it easier for the other player to coordinate.
Clark (2007) provides evidence that rates of
time preference (proxied by risk-free interest
rates) have differed across societies and across
centuries. According to our results, that may help
explain why different political, economic, and so-
cial institutions have been sustained across the
millennia: with more patient members of society,
better equilibria have a higher probability of being
sustained. Cross-sectionally, economists have rou-
tinely found that time preference differs across
groups: the future is discounted more heavily by
12 Note that Result 6 is not driven by the effect of the 4%
difference in average stag play on the upper bound of ,
because the difference in the upper bounds is less than 0.02.
Table 7
The Effect of Attributes on the Probability of Playing Stag Given Having Played Stag in the Previous
Period
Model 1 2 3 4 5
Dependent variable Play stag dummy Play stag dummy Play stag dummy Play stag dummy Play stag dummy
Unit Individual Individual Individual Individual Individual
Cognitive ability 0.0065 — — 0.0012 0.0023
(0.015) — — (0.015) (0.015)
Patience — 0.060 — 0.059 0.059
— (0.024) — (0.024) (0.023)
Risk tolerance — — 0.021 0.019 0.013
— — (0.018) (0.017) (0.017)
Openness — — — — 0.031
— — — — (0.018)
Conscientiousness — — — — 0.011
— — — — (0.018)
Extraversion — — — — 0.0087
— — — — (0.021)
Agreeableness — — — — 0.0070
— — — — (0.020)
Neuroticism — — — — 0.023
— — — — (0.020)
Male (dummy; not
standardized) — — — — 0.16
— — — — (0.046)
Age (in years; not
standardized) — — — — 0.0020
— — — — (0.0035)
R-squared 0.12 0.14 0.12 0.15 0.19
Observations 973 973 973 973 973
Period effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Session effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustering Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note. See Table 3 for additional explanation.
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low-income individuals (e.g., Lawrance, 1991)
and by smokers (a literature beginning with
Fuchs, 1982). Our results indicate that if groups
differ in patience, there are likely to be substantial
social consequences.
Our results also suggest that a potential solution
to coordination problems is to group patient peo-
ple together and thereafter expand group size
(Weber, 2006). Alternatively, using lessons from
the marketing and social psychology literature,
one can emphasize patience to coordination-game
players through conscious and unconscious prim-
ing (Bargh, 2006).
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Appendix
Experimental Instructions
Welcome to our study in decision-making. Today’s experiment will be done on the computer.
You each have a printed copy of the instructions. I will read through those.
If you pay attention and make good decisions, you may earn a considerable amount of money.
At the end of the experiment, you will be paid your earnings privately and in cash. I remind you
that today’s experiment will take approximately 90 minutes. Today you will do several different
tasks.
Just for showing up, you have earned $5. All earnings for today’s tasks will be in addition to the
$5.
For the remainder of this experiment, please refrain from any communication with other
participants. Please put away your cell phones.
The first two tasks are Task 1 and Task 2. Later on, you will do Task 4 and Task 5. In each of
these tasks, the choices that you make will determine your earnings. However you will only be paid
the earnings that correspond to one of the four tasks. At the end of the experiment, I will roll a die
to determine which of the three tasks will be used to determine your earnings for Task 1, Task 2,
Task 4 and Task 5. You will have a 10% change of being paid for Task 5 and an equal (30%)
chance of being paid for each of the other three tasks.
Task 1
You will be put into pairs randomly. You will never know the identity of your partner. You will
only interact with your partner. You will play the game with the same partner over 10 rounds.
• If you select blue, then you earn exactly $0.50 regardless of what your partner selects.
• If you select green, then:
• If your partner also selects green, then you earn $0.75.
• If your partner selects blue, then you earn $0.
Your partner faces exactly the same decision and earnings. You will play this for 10 rounds. At
the end of each round, you will find out how much you earned for that round. You will then proceed
to the next round.
Task 213
You will again be put into pairs randomly. Your partner in Task 2 is guaranteed to be different
to your partner in Task 1. You will never know the identity of your partner. You will only interact
with your partner. You will play the game with the same partner over 10 rounds.
13 Task 2 is the prisoner’s dilemma; see footnote 3.
(Appendix continues)
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• If you select square, then:
• If your partner also selects square, then you earn $0.25.
• If your partner selects circle, then you earn $1.50.
• If you select circle, then:
• If your partner selects square, then you earn $0.
• If your partner also selects circle, then you earn $1.
Your partner faces exactly the same decision and earnings. You will play this for 10 rounds. At
the end of each round, you will find out how much you earned for that round. You will then proceed
to the next round.
Task 3
Task 3 is a survey that we would like you to complete. You will be paid $5 for completing this
short survey. We will pay you as soon as you complete the survey.
Please answer the questions carefully and truthfully. We guarantee that we will treat these
surveys with the utmost confidentiality. I will now read the instructions in front of you.
Describe yourself as you generally are now, not as you wish to be in the future. Describe yourself
as you honestly see yourself, in relation to other people you know of the same sex as you are, and
roughly your same age. So that you can describe yourself in an honest manner, your responses will
be kept in absolute confidence.
Indicate for each statement whether it is:
1. Very inaccurate
2. Moderately inaccurate
3. Neither accurate nor inaccurate
4. Moderately accurate
5. Very accurate
as a description of you.
1. Am the life of the party. 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5
2. Feel little concern for others. 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5
3. Am always prepared. 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5
4. Get stressed out easily. 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5
5. Have a rich vocabulary. 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5
6. Don’t talk a lot. 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5
7. Am interested in people. 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5
8. Leave my belongings around. 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5
9. Am relaxed most of the time. 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5
10. Have difficulty understanding abstract ideas. 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5
11. Feel comfortable around people. 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5
12. Insult people. 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5
13. Pay attention to details. 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5
(Appendix continues)
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14. Worry about things. 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5
15. Have a vivid imagination. 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5
16. Keep in the background. 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5
17. Sympathize with others’ feelings. 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5
18. Make a mess of things. 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5
19. Seldom feel blue. 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5
20. Am not interested in abstract ideas. 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5
21. Start conversations. 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5
22. Am not interested in other people’s problems. 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5
23. Get chores done right away. 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5
24. Am easily disturbed. 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5
25. Have excellent ideas. 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5
26. Have little to say. 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5
27. Have a soft heart. 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5
28. Often forget to put things back in their proper place. 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5
29. Get upset easily. 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5
30. Do not have a good imagination. 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5
31. Talk to a lot of different people at parties. 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5
32. Am not really interested in others. 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5
33. Like order. 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5
34. Change my mood a lot. 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5
35. Am quick to understand things. 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5
36. Don’t like to draw attention to myself. 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5
37. Take time out for others. 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5
38. Shirk my duties. 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5
39. Have frequent mood swings. 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5
40. Use difficult words. 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5
41. Don’t mind being the center of attention. 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5
42. Feel others’ emotions. 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5
43. Follow a schedule. 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5
44. Get irritated easily. 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5
45. Spend time reflecting on things. 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5
46. Am quiet around strangers. 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5
47. Make people feel at ease. 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5
48. Am exacting in my work. 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5
49. Often feel blue. 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5
50. Am full of ideas. 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5
[Demographic survey]
1. What is your age in years?
2. What is your gender? Male / Female
3. Do you live on campus or off campus?
4. What is the highest level of education that you have completed? Less than high school / High
school diploma or GED / Bachelor’s degree / Master’s degree / Doctoral degree
5. What class are you in? Freshman / Sophomore / Junior / Senior / MA student / Pre-
dissertation PhD student / Dissertation PhD student
(Appendix continues)
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6. In what range is your GPA? 0 to 2.0 / 2.1 to 2.5 / 2.6 to 3.0 / 3.1 to 3.5 / 3.6 to 4.0
7. If you took it, what was your sat verbal score? (leave blank if you did not take it.)
8. If you took it, what was your sat quantitative score? (leave blank if you did not take it.)
9. If you took it, what was your GRE verbal score? (leave blank if you did not take it.)
10. If you took it, what was your GRE quantitative score? (leave blank if you did not take it.)
11. If you took it, what was your GRE analytical score? (leave blank if you did not take it.)
Task 4
In this task you will make decisions alone and your earnings will not depend upon the decisions
of others. Recall that at the end of the experiment, we will roll a die to determine which out of Task
1, Task 2, Task 4, and Task 5 will be used to determine your earnings for the four tasks. You will
have a 10% change of being paid for Task 5 and an equal (30%) chance of being paid for each of
the other three tasks.
You will be given a series of choices between two games of chance. For each pair of games, you
should indicate which of the two games you prefer to play. If you end up getting paid for Task 4,
you will actually get the chance to play one of the games of chance you choose, so you should think
carefully about which games of chance you prefer.
Here is a pair of games of chance like the ones you will see on your screen, although the display
on your screen will be bigger and easier to read.
The outcome of the games of chance will be determined by a random number between 1 and 8.
Each number between (and including) 1 and 8 is equally likely to occur. In fact, you will be able
to roll the number yourself using a 8-sided die.
In the above example, the left game pays nothing ($0) if the random number is between 1 and
7, and pays $30 if the random number is 8. Notice that the size of the pie slices shows you the
chances of each possible outcome.
In the above example, the game on the right pays nothing ($0) if the random number is between 1
and 6, and pays $10 if the random number is between 7 and 8. As with the game on the left, the pie slices
represent the fraction of the possible numbers which yield each payoff.
Each pair of games is on a separate screen on the computer. On each screen, you should indicate
which of the games you prefer to play by clicking on one of the three boxes beneath the games.
You should click the ‘Left’ box if you prefer the game on the left, the ‘Right’ box if you prefer the
game on the right, and the ‘Don’t care’ button if you do not prefer one or the other.
(Appendix continues)
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You should approach each pair of games as if it is the only pair of games you are considering,
because if you end up getting paid for this task, you are only going to play one of the many games.
If you chose ‘Don’t care’ in the games that we play out, we will pick one for you using a coin flip.
If you end up getting paid for Task 4, then at the end of the experiment, after you have worked
through all of the pairs of games, we will roll a die to determine which pair of games have been
chosen to play. If you picked ‘Don’t care’ for that pair, we will flip a coin to decide which one you
will play. Then we will let you roll the die to determine the outcome of the game you chose (or the
game that was selected for you based on the coin flip).
For instance, suppose you picked the game on the left in the above example. If your die roll was
6, you would win nothing; if it was 8, you would get $30. If you picked the game on the right and
rolled a 6, you would win nothing; if it was 8, you would get $10.
Therefore if end up getting paid for task 4, then your earnings are determined by three things:
1. Which pair of games of chance is chosen at random to be played out.
2. Which game you chose for the pair selected to be played.
3. The outcome of the game when you roll a die.
This is not a test of whether you can pick the best game in each pair, because none of the games
are necessarily better than the others. Which games you prefer is a matter of personal taste. The
people next to you may have different tastes, so their responses should not matter to you. Please
work silently, and make your choices by thinking carefully about each game.
As a reminder, whether or not you get paid for task 4 does not affect your earnings from other
tasks.
Task 5
In this task you will make decisions alone and your earnings will not depend upon the decisions
of others. Recall that at the end of the experiment, we will roll a die to determine which out of Task
1, Task 2, Task 4, and Task 5 will be used to determine your earnings for the four tasks. You will
have a 10% change of being paid for Task 5 and an equal (30%) chance of being paid for each of
the other three tasks.
In the following sheet you are asked to choose between smaller payments tomorrow and larger
payments in the future. Each choice looks like the one below:
Instead of X and Y you will see actual dollar amounts. For each row, choose one payment: either
the smaller, sooner payment or the larger, later payment. There are 20 decisions in total.
If you end up getting paid for Task 5, you will each roll a die to select one of the 20 rows at
random. We will then pay you according to your choice for that row. Any one of the rows could
be the row that counts! Treat each decision as if it could be the one that determines your payment.
We will place the money in an envelope in front of you. You will then seal the envelope and sign
across the seal. We will then walk with you to Carow Hall, which is the building across the parking
lot, and hand the envelope to Ms. Jane Perry, who is a staff member. You can pick up the payment
either tomorrow or a week from now, depending on the choice you made. You can also pick up the
envelope at any later time. You will be given a letter on university letterhead confirming this
procedure. You each have an example in front of you.
(Appendix continues)
Question Which do you prefer
1 $X tomorrow $Y a week from now
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[There are 20 rows; X is always $10.00, Y starts at $10.50 and increases in $0.50 increments
until $20.00]
[Following letter is personalized and is printed on GMU letterhead]
Task 6
This is the final task in the experiment. You will be paid $10 for completing this test. We will
pay you as soon as you complete the test. The test will take 45 minutes. Once the 45 minutes are
finished, we will pay you for Task 6 in addition to any outstanding earnings from previous tasks.
Please note that your earnings will not depend upon the number of correct answers you give. You
will be paid $10 at the end of the 45 minutes.
As with all other aspects of this experiment, your choices are completely confidential.
(Appendix continues)
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The next task consists of a sequence of puzzles. You will find on your desk a black booklet.
Please do not write in the booklet. Please open the booklet to page A1.
On each page there is a pattern at the top with a missing segment, and a number of possible
completions for the missing segment at the bottom. Only one of these correctly completes the
pattern. It is up to you to select the right option that completes the pattern.
For page A1, the correct answer is 4. Please find the answer sheet on your desk and write number
4 in the first box in column A.
Now turn to page a2. the correct answer is 5. Please write number 5 in the second box in column
A on the answer sheet.
Now you are on your own. have a look at the remaining pages and try to answer each problem
as best you can.
[Above is a sample problem from the Raven’s test]
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